Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 13

Number 1

Article 2

Getting Deterrence Right: The Case for Stratified Deterrence
Brent J. Talbot
U.S. Air Force Academy, brent.talbot@usafa.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss

pp. 26-40
Recommended Citation

Talbot, Brent J.. "Getting Deterrence Right: The Case for Stratified
Deterrence." Journal of Strategic Security 13, no. 1 (2020) : 26-40.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.1.1748
Available at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss1/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Digital
Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic
Security by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Getting Deterrence Right: The Case for Stratified Deterrence
Abstract
The potential for hostilities in the 21st Century is not likely to be deterred by a Cold War
deterrence strategy. And while nuclear deterrence remains important, regional powers
armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and accompanying long-range delivery
capabilities are a rising concern. New technological breakthroughs in the space, cyber, and
unforeseen realms could also provide asymmetric means of undermining deterrence.
Moreover, the effort to achieve strategic stability in this day and age has become
increasingly complicated in light of the changing relationship among the great powers.
Today’s world has become one of “security trilemmas.” Actions one state takes to defend
against another can, in-turn, make a third state feel insecure. There is great need for both
nuclear diversity (theater and low-yield weapons) and increased conventional capabilities
in the U.S. deterrent force to provide strategic stability in the decades ahead. In sum, we
need a deterrence construct that both deters nuclear use by the great powers and
terminates nuclear use by both regional powers and so called rogue states initiating
nuclear wars on neighbors. I propose herein a policy of stratified deterrence which
addresses deterrence needs at each potential level of conflict.
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Introduction
Cold War deterrence strategy was based on a balance of terror or mutual
assured destruction, but the 21st Century contains new threats, new actors,
not so easily deterred. While nuclear deterrence remains important,
regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
accompanying long-range delivery capabilities are a rising concern as
noted by United States-North Korean relations and rhetoric of the past few
years. New technological breakthroughs in the space, cyber, and
unforeseen realms could also provide asymmetric means of undermining
deterrence. Traditional deterrence is less certain in this environment, and
policies (along with accompanying capabilities) of the Cold War era may
actually be destabilizing, as additional regional powers are increasingly
likely to arm themselves with WMD or asymmetric technologies.
Kartchner and Gerson state that there is a greater possibility for limited
nuclear war in this post-Cold War era.1
Furthermore, the effort to achieve strategic stability has become
increasingly complicated in light of the changing relationship between the
great powers. The era of bipolarity ended with the Cold War and today the
United States is no longer the hegemon it became by default with the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Today’s world has become one of security
trilemmas, according to Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper: actions
one state takes to defend against another can, in-turn, make a third state
feel insecure.2 For example, Russian efforts to deter the United States also
impact European security. Chinese actions influence the United States,
Russia, and India. Therefore, the security trilemma means that actions
that would have mattered only on a bilateral level, in Cold War terms, now
have greater strategic consequences.
So how did we get to where we are today? Why do U.S. policymakers see
the Cold War triad as the best solution to continued strategic stability?
Have they considered the changed environment of the post-Cold War
world? Our discussion will begin with deterrence thinking of the early Cold
War, proposing the need to differentiate counter-value and counterforce
targeting for a 21st Century deterrence construct, and defining strategic
stability for our time with accompanying refinement of the trilemma
argument introduced above. This narrative will point out flaws in the
proposed triad; there is great need for both nuclear diversity (theater and
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low-yield weapons) and non-nuclear elements in the deterrent force to
provide strategic stability in the decades ahead. In sum, we need a
deterrence construct that both deters nuclear use by the great powers and
terminates nuclear use by so-called rogue states initiating nuclear wars on
neighbors. This essay presents a stratified deterrence policy, which
addresses deterrence needs at each potential level of conflict.
Early Deterrence Thinking
Just after World War II ended, General “Hap” Arnold who led Army Air
Forces during the war, offered enduring advice about deterrence: “Our
first line of defense is the ability to retaliate even after receiving the
hardest blow the enemy can deliver.”3 Therefore, from its early beginnings,
nuclear deterrence had to mean to an enemy that retaliation would come
following nuclear weapons use. Bernard Brodie took this logic one-step
further:
The first and most vital step in the American security program for
the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee ourselves
in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind…Thus far the
chief purpose of a military establishment has been to win wars.
From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have
almost no other useful purpose.4
Development of an assured retaliation is the best means of deterring an
enemy over time. This concept came to be known as a survivable second
strike capability, or the ability to survive an enemy nuclear force that
strikes first. It doesn’t matter whether the enemy focuses its efforts on
military bases and forces or the U.S. population centers. Retaliation which
disables the enemy in a way that ensures defeat, whether it be near
complete loss of military forces or unacceptable damage to his polity and
society, would assure the United States a second strike capability. The idea
was to achieve Mutual Assured Destruction between the superpowers.
As the 1950s unfolded, the U.S. nuclear posture consisted of a growing
bomber force with sufficient numbers for retaliation against any Soviet
attack. Toward the end of the decade as rumors of a bomber gap, and later,
a missile gap unfolded, the United States was developing intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles
27
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(SLBMs). Fear of the rumors, aided in the case of the missile gap by the
success of Sputnik, and not discounting U.S. inter-service rivalry, resulted
in eventual deployment of a triad of bombers, missiles, and submarines
that would guarantee survival and ensure a second strike capability against
Soviet nuclear aggression.
Still, there were two additional Cold War perspectives on deterrence.
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), was only one such perception based
upon stability. Lebow and Stein argue that many among the U.S. military
establishment argued for a stronger option: strategic superiority, a
decapitation strategy to destroy Soviet leadership, command, control and
communications abilities associated with warfighting, and hardened
targets enabling a nuclear warfighting victory over the Soviets. In essence,
the goal was to go beyond MAD and have the means to eliminate a Soviet
second strike should nuclear war break out. And at the opposite end of the
spectrum there was a third option: finite deterrence, arguing that nuclear
deterrence only required limited capabilities along the lines of other major
powers nuclear inventories besides the United States and the Soviet
Union.5 A minimal ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons was enough
due to the uncertainly that some might get through defenses and strike
their targets, so that even a few nuclear detonations received in retaliation
would create too high of a cost for a nation contemplating a first strike.
Lebow and Stein go on to compare the strategies to the Cuban missile
crisis of 1963. Despite a numerical advantage of 3500 usable nuclear
weapons in the U.S. strategic inventory compared to the Soviet’s 350, and
further belief that only 30 or so of their weapons would likely reach targets
in the United States, America was deterred. As McGeorge Bundy
described, “even if one Soviet weapon landed on an American target, we
would all be losers."6 The United States was deterred in spite of its own
nuclear superiority, pointing to finite deterrence as the more rational
option. Minimum deterrence, while unintentional on the part of the
Soviets, worked. The authors go on to argue that other Cold War crises
also occurred when the Soviet Union was weak and the United States was
strong, but then the relationship stabilized when the Soviets achieved
nuclear parity. In other words, the imbalance prompted Soviet posturing
in each crisis. The authors add that “too much deterrence,” as in MAD,
fuels an arms race that makes both sides less secure, and thus, conclude
that finite deterrence is the most stabilizing posture “because it prompts
28
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mutual caution” between the superpowers.7 Still, finite deterrence does not
fully address strategic stability per the assured destruction concept
embedded within MAD. To enhance this concept further, I turn to another
Cold War deterrence concept.

Counter-value vs Counterforce
In 1960, a major debate was ensuing between the Air Force and Navy over
counterforce and counter value (or counter-cities) targeting strategy. The
Navy maintained that its proposed Polaris submarine force could provide
deterrence by having the capability to elude attack by hiding in the depths
of the sea, then counter any Soviet attack by destroying all major Soviet
cities. This retaliation from the sea would provide the kind of deterrence
Brodie had argued for, and thus, deter a Soviet attack on the United States.
The Air Force, on the other hand, believed that
effective deterrence is achievable only through possession of a
striking power that threatens destruction of substantially all of an
enemy’s long-range nuclear capability [countering nuclear
forces]…a threat to destroy a large number of Soviet citizens does
not represent effective deterrence of a Soviet attack against the
United States.8
In addition, of greater concern to European allies, “It provides no
deterrence of other forms of Soviet aggression such as an attack against
another NATO country.”9
Interestingly, William Kaufman, then a member of the Air Force Scientific
Board and scientist employed at RAND Corporation, decided to apply
RAND’s mathematical models to the problem of which type of deterrence
best suited United States deterrence purposes. While much could be said
about the errors of estimates they were working with at the time, Kaufman
modeled three scenarios—the Navy-preferred counter-value deterrence
model, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) preference for mixing the
models (counterforce and counter-value), and Kaufman’s own preference
for strictly a counterforce model. The minimum deterrence war gaming
scenario consisted of a United States retaliatory strike against the Soviets
after their own plausible first strike an American cities, resulting in 150
million Americans dead and 60 percent of United States industrial
29
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capacity destroyed (on the Soviet side, only 40 million would die and 40
percent of industrial capacity would be lost). Secondly, using SAC’s
optimal mix strategy—a mix of counterforce and counter value, half the
industrial base in each country would be destroyed along with 110 million
Americans (and 75 million Russians). Finally, and in support of Kaufman’s
argument, the counterforce (targeting no cities on either side) strategy
would result in only 3 million American and five million Russian deaths. 10
As a result, the Air Force became sold on counterforce strategy on the eve
of President Kennedy’s election and would move in that direction as it
developed its legs of the nuclear triad during the 1960s.
What the RAND mathematicians ignored was the pressure that would be
brought to bear on any politician dealing with a few million civilian
casualties during nuclear war—the revenge factor would likely require
massive retaliation in all plausible nuclear scenarios. It also ignores Carl
von Clausewitz’ fundamental dictum concerning chance and friction—once
a nuclear war starts, these elements would steer the course of events in
unknown directions, which mathematical models cannot anticipate.
Deterrence is an effort to prevent war, not determine whether various
types will minimize the threat of failure or loss of life, as in the RAND
scenarios.
Driving Kaufman’s calculation was a belief that President Eisenhower’s
policy of massive retaliation would encourage the Soviets to engage in
piecemeal aggression. “As long as each side had enough nuclear weapons
to destroy the other, the threat of massive retaliation to small-scale
conventional aggression lacks credibility.”11 Massive retaliation was based
on a counter-value model. Holding enemy cities hostage was supposed to
prevent nuclear war, but Kaufman asserted correctly, as demonstrated by
history, that smaller scale wars can be conducted below the nuclear
threshold. The Soviets had supported North Korea; they would support
Cuba and North Vietnam during the 1960s and Arab States against Israel
(aided by the United States) in the sixties, seventies, and eighties. In
Kaufman’s mind, the proper deterrent must “show a willingness and
ability to intervene with great conventional power in the peripheral
areas.”12
Further insight might also be gained from Kaufman’s assertions, as well as
the earlier-mentioned missile crisis scenario. Consider China’s philosophy
30
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of minimum deterrence; China’s simple construction of a counter-value
nuclear deterrent still deters the United States with far fewer weapons
than what is in the U.S. inventory.13 For the same reason, the United States
was deterred from aggression against the Soviets during the Cuban missile
crisis, despite massive nuclear superiority. Supporting this view is the
Sechser and Fuhrmann study on Nuclear Weapons and Coercive
Diplomacy. The authors conclude that nuclear weapons do not provide
any coercive bargaining advantages, nor does nuclear superiority ensure
coercive victories during interstate crises. However, when it comes to
deterrence, nuclear forces minimize the impact of coercive threats from
challengers; the Indian aggression against Pakistan from 2001 to 2002
was likely minimized by nuclear deterrence, and U.S. military assistance to
Ukraine from 2014 to 2015 was reduced by Russian nuclear deterrence.14
Considering the above logic, savings could be gained by reducing plans to
renew the U.S. nuclear enterprise on the proposed scale—perhaps even
eliminating a leg of the triad. That savings could be directed toward
developing a wider variety of both nuclear (in terms of lower yield and
delivery options) and non-nuclear weapons to improve both U.S. nuclear
and conventional deterrence, but more importantly, addressing the lack of
coercive value of nuclear weapons. Where American foreign policy must
act to prevent nuclear war or prevent impending actions by a rogue actor,
conventional weapons are more likely to provide coercive bargaining
power, knowing that the aggressor will more likely use them.
In fact, a conventional counterforce deterrent, accompanied by a nuclear
deterrent, which provides the means for sufficient counter-value
retaliation, along with meeting theater nuclear challenges such as Russia’s
escalate to de-escalate doctrine,15 provides a better means of deterrence
and escalation dominance. Note that the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) calls for lower yield options for SLBMs and new nuclear-armed air
and sea-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs and SLCMs).16 Moreover,
conventional weapons could be the first line of defense against enemy
space and cyber-attacks, as well as nuclear weapons use by rogue actors,
thereby providing a counterforce deterrent. If a theater nuclear war was
initiated, accidental or otherwise, the use of conventional weapons to
eliminate remaining enemy nuclear forces would not be accompanied by
massive civilian losses resulting amongst our enemy’s pressure to retaliate
with any surviving nuclear weapons. A non-nuclear counterforce enhances
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bargaining power. Moreover, in the case of nuclear use by lesser powers
(or even China or Russia for that matter), the United States can still
threaten enemy cities if they continue nuclear use; we may save our own
cities and convince an enemy to back down knowing our remaining
nuclear forces are at least equal to their own.

Strategic Stability and the Trilemma
The classic definition of strategic stability from the Cold War era was
spelled out by Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin in their book
Strategy and Arms Control. Therein the authors posit that a reduced risk
of war between great powers means not only ensuring that no one has an
incentive to strike first, but also that the calculation equation prevents risk
from “shocks, alarms and perturbations.”17 Their definition, when
compared to Arnold and Brodie’s deterrence concept, not only stipulates
confidence that a means of answering a first strike with a devastating
response by surviving forces is guaranteed, but a second strike capability
must be accentuated by a “prevent risk” equation. Stability against a
contemplated first strike by itself is not enough to guarantee strategic
stability, particularly in light of opportunities for unforeseen technological
advancements to create shocks and perturbations in the perceived balance
of forces.
Interestingly, Elbridge Colby took on the challenge of defining strategic
stability for the post-Cold War era with emphasis on the impact of
President Obama’s 2010 NPR, which advocated a reduced role for nuclear
weapons, supporting the concept of finite deterrence. Presuming the
situation stable between Russia and the United States, Colby declared that
either state would see no “need nor incentive to use nuclear weapons
except to make clear to an opponent that he had crossed a most vital red
line with the probability that he would suffer further—and perhaps
catastrophic—loss if he continued his aggression.”18 Furthermore, “some
uses of nuclear weapons must be valid for real stability to endure. In a
stable situation, then, major war would only come about because one party
truly sought it, not because of miscalculation.”19
It is important to note that Colby’s definition applies to all nuclearweapons states and not just Russia and the United States. He continues:
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strategic stability would definitively not be to attempt to break out
of a situation of mutual vulnerability, given such an effort’s toxic
combination of futility and dramatic escalatory impetus, but rather
to signal to an opponent that he had transgressed a most vital
interest, to demonstrate one’s resolve about climbing the
imperfectly controllable ladder of escalation, and to inflict pain on
the opponent to attempt to dissuade him from pursuing his course
of action.20
The crux of Colby’s argument is the need to control escalation dynamics
when an adversary crosses a red line regarding a state’s vital interests. He
adds, “the side with a greater variety of and more tailored options for
limited nuclear use would be in a strong position in such a struggle, since
his threats to strike would be both more credible and his strikes more
damaging.”21
While Colby’s argument is applicable to the major nuclear powers
(particularly Russia and China), it applies even more to the rising powers
and rogues who are more likely risk-takers when considering the
aforementioned security trilemma and accompanying WMD/asymmetric
technologies-associated proliferation dynamics. Furthermore, Larsen
warns that wars appearing as limited to great powers likely look more like
total war to smaller states, in which case smaller states or non-state actors
with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will likely
assume they have little to lose by using them.22 In other words, it would be
sensible to apply Colby’s logic responding to such threats in the nonnuclear realm as well. Why not ensure escalation dominance at the
conventional level against the rising threat of new states and non-state
actors who acquire WMD and other emerging dangerous technologies?
Stability is then more likely to be established with the lesser nuclear and
other WMD/asymmetric technology powers acting against U.S. interests.
When deterrence fails, conventional escalation dominance can provide a
denial mechanism to preempt against nuclear or other WMD threats, and
where necessary defeat rogue actors without crossing the nuclear
threshold, while still providing a security umbrella to U.S. allies and
partners in the region.
The security trilemma requires the United States to involve itself globally
in order to address proliferation concerns that threaten interests of allies
33
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and partners in their respective regions. Koblentz describes the security
trilemma as a “transmission belt, developments that might have mattered
only at a bilateral level now have the potential to have much wider
strategic consequences.”23 The trilemma concept also implores the United
States to act against nuclear proliferation to avoid cascade effects that
would necessarily follow. It has often been said that Iranian proliferation
would likely beget Saudi, Egyptian, Emirati, and perhaps Turkish nuclear
programs to counter the Iranian threat, thus increasing tensions and the
likelihood of nuclear use in an already tense and war-torn Mideast region.
Moreover, Paul Bracken reminds us of the second mover proliferation
advantage. Iran was a second mover, an aspiring nuclear proliferator
benefitting from those who had gone before. In Iran’s case, Pakistani A.Q.
Khan passed on uranium enrichment secrets making it easier for Iran to
begin its own nuclear weapons program. An Iran bomb will likely result in
the Saudis benefitting from the same source since they will feel threatened
by Iran. The Saudis may be able to acquire ready-made nuclear weapons
from Pakistan, which they helped to fund in the first place.24

Strategic Stability via Stratified Deterrence
The essay argues for a new deterrence construct which accounts for the
changed world of the 21st Century. We now face a multipolar world with
great powers—the United States, China, Russia, and perhaps India will
join the club in the future. Other regional powers with nuclear weapons
(Pakistan, North Korea) as well as regional aspirants (Iran) also play an
important role in the deterrence construct. Moreover, this new
environment multiplies the possible outcomes of the security trilemma,
where deterrence policy of one actor intended to influence another also
impacts a third (or additional) player(s), and in some cases, many more.
Furthermore, when one considers that United States extended deterrence
applies to 30-plus allied or partner states, the United States requires the
means to provide a so called nuclear umbrella to states all around the
globe, along with a more complex strategy and ability to tailor deterrence
to specific adversaries. Tailored deterrence, as discussed in the 2018 NPR,
means “there is no ‘one size fits all’ for deterrence… the United States will
apply a tailored approach to effectively deter across a spectrum of
adversaries, threats, and contexts.”25 Scholars have recently used the
terms cross-domain or multi-domain deterrence to describe the tailored
approach, and key to application of the term is mixing nuclear and non34
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 1

nuclear forces in the deterrence construct. The latest NPR includes beefed
up “missile defenses” as well as a “range of conventional and nuclear
capabilities” in its construct for a tailored approach.26
To simplify the argument, the United States must first maintain a nuclear
deterrent to great power conflict, or prevent war with Russia and China.
Strategic nuclear weapons provide this deterrent, represented by the
United States triad and efforts to renew all three legs—and while renewal
is necessary, expanding the escalation ladder may not require all three legs
of the triad. Money saved eliminating one leg could help pay for the other
upgrades recommended herein and designed to provide both deterrent
and coercion effects to other players beyond the great powers. This
deterrent construct allows a reduced stockpile of nuclear weapons aimed
at counter-value targets as earlier described by the Chinese deterrent,
because survival of even one opposing weapon to a first strike is terrifying
to the attacker. In this manner, the great powers are deterred from using
nuclear weapons against one another. We can label this the first level or
stratum of strategic nuclear deterrence.
Secondly, to prevent conventional aggression resulting in follow-on smallscale nuclear use by one great power against another, or an attempt to
deescalate a conflict by escalating to theater nuclear use of low yield
weapons, the United States needs a variety of theater nuclear weapons
along the escalation continuum in order to match any nuclear use by a
great power—or regional power for that matter—tit for tat. In the case of
Europe, this also reassures our NATO allies that limited Russian
aggression against a NATO member will keep the United States engaged in
conflict even if Russia attempted limited nuclear use in order to prevail.
Limited use could be met with limited use, taking away any perceived
advantage the Russians attribute to their theater nuclear weapons,
particularly their perceived ability to deescalate a conflict through theater
nuclear use. American efforts to add lower yield warheads to SLBMs and
reacquire nuclear armed SLCMs for the Navy, along with Air Force ALCMs
and upgrades to the B-61 tactical nuclear weapon and addition of a nuclear
launch capability to the F-35 fighter all fit into this escalation category,
and are in response to Russian violation of the Intermediate-range
Nuclear Forces Treaty.27
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Third, the above-mentioned theater nuclear weapons would also deter
regional nuclear powers. Any effort on their part to attack a U.S. ally or
partner could again be met by American theater nuclear weapons. More
importantly, developing the proper array of advanced conventional
weapons and ensuring rapid response capability anywhere a potential
enemy might strike would supplement as well as provide greater control of
escalation dynamics in regional conflicts. Kartchner and Gerson suggest
that the “nuclear taboo may not be as strong among emerging nuclear
powers,” that such powers are likely to use asymmetric means, including
provocation of third parties to compel their assistance against the United
States, and therefore, escalation dominance will be required to respond to
such threats.28 If a regional adversary perceived that nuclear use would
result in the loss of its nuclear arsenal via escalation dominance,
particularly via a more credible conventional attack, then it would be less
likely to use nuclear weapons. Even conventional attack on a U.S. ally or
partner would more likely be deterred by superior U.S. forces in the
region, or able to rapidly deploy there. Moreover, in places where
American forces cannot be made readily available, using the triad savings
of eliminating one leg to develop Conventional Prompt Global Strike
(CPGS) weapons would ensure we have the ability to intervene in order to
deescalate conflicts around the globe.
Lastly, missile defenses are crucial to a stratified deterrence construct.
Proliferation efforts are just as likely to result in crises riddled with
misperceptions, the possibility of unintentional missile launches, or
intentional provocations. In such instances an ability to shoot down an
attacking missile and prevent its destruction of a target, whether military
or civilian, saves lives and reduces the pressure for immediate and
overwhelming retaliation. In addition, in an empirical study, Quackenbush
determined that "national missile defense enhances deterrence stability,”
countering traditional deterrence arguments about the destabilizing
effects of missile defenses.29

Conclusion
Achieving strategic stability in the post-Cold War and post-Superpower
era has become increasingly complicated in light of the changing
relationship between the great powers, nuclear proliferation by regional
powers, and the rise of rogue state and non-state actors capable of taking
36
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advantage of asymmetric means of attack. New technological
breakthroughs in the space, cyber, and unforeseen realms empower
asymmetries that undermine deterrence at all levels of conflict and require
a new means of providing deterrence and stability in the international
system. Cold War deterrence strategy no longer meets the requirements of
a changed world of the 21st Century.
Early Cold War deterrence theory provides lessons on how to structure a
more stable international order. Finite deterrence, while unintentional,
worked for the Soviets in preventing a United States attack on Soviet
missiles in Cuba, and in fact, U.S. nuclear dominance in the early Cold
War did not prevent Soviet conventional wars initiated against U.S.
interests. In essence, finite or minimum deterrence provides the best
means of stability for great power relations. Still, a revanchist Russia now
boasts of an escalate-to-deescalate strategy intended to stop a NATO
conventional response to Russian aggression in Europe. This can only be
countered at the theater level by responding to theater nuclear use in like
manner. Moreover, Colby has demonstrated that strategic stability is more
a function of escalation dominance than nuclear superiority or mutual
assured destruction vis-à-vis conflict with regional powers. Such
dominance must exist at the conventional level and be matched or
exceeded at the theater nuclear level. Conventional weapons are more
likely to provide coercive bargaining power than nuclear weapons, which
have been shown to lack coercive value because regional and rogue actors
do not believe great powers will use them. The great power must dominate
by conventional means to keep the regional power in check, and this is
especially applicable when dealing with rogue or non-state actors more
likely to accept high levels of risk.
Revisiting Colby’s need for more tailored options for each level of conflict,
this essay proposes the concept of Stratified Deterrence. The United States
must first continue to deter great power conflict with strategic nuclear
weapons while understanding that less is more—finite deterrence works—
we can eliminate a leg of the triad to fund the additional needs of
escalation dominance.30 We need more theater nuclear options to counter
regional powers. The newest NPR proposes such with lower yield
warheads for SLBMs, reacquiring nuclear SLCMs for the naval fleet, and
new ALCMs for the bomber force. Moreover, we should not ignore the
dual-capable fighter aircraft and role they contribute to both the theater
37
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nuclear and conventional construct. Finally, we must also make sure that
escalation dynamics covers the conventional realm when it comes to
regional powers and rogue actors. Expanded missile defenses, continued
power projection via naval and air forces, and an added ability to provide
CPGS would ensure we can counter any attack promptly. In this manner,
the U.S. inventory will be better suited to responding to the kinds of
dynamics all three types of actors might present, particularly concerning
the Brooks/Rapp-Hooper security trilemma and corresponding unknowns
of space, cyber and other future asymmetric capabilities that emerge in
enemy inventories.
In sum, stratified deterrence will allow the United States to prevent or
quickly extinguish limited nuclear wars that may break out in the
uncertain environment of the world we find ourselves living in. The
planned revitalization of the Cold War triad may well deter the great
powers, but the rising and proliferating regional powers as well as rogue
state and non-state actors are the greater concern of this era. The 2018
NPR additions of theater nuclear weapons provide the needs for theater
nuclear deterrence, but the conventional realm is where the real
investments are needed—additional naval and air forces along with
development and fielding of new CPGS weapons are key to responding to
rogue and non-state actor threats around the globe. But the strategy comes
at a high price and is likely not affordable alongside replacing the entire
strategic nuclear inventory; thus, this essay advocates some type of
reduction in strategic nuclear weapons—providing a finite deterrent
instead of the planned MAD-based triad. Savings therefrom provide a
means for additional theater nuclear and conventional weapons funding.31
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